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Abstract
We examine the relationship between environmental regulations and innovation, using data from UK
manufacturing industry during 2000-2006. We estimate a dynamic model of innovation behaviour, and
explicitly account for the likely endogeneity of our measure of the burden of environmental regulations
(pollution abatement costs). Our results indicate that environmental R&D and investment in environ-
mental capital are stimulated by greater pollution abatement pressures. However, we do not ￿nd a
positive impact of environmental compliance costs on total R&D or total capital accumulation. New
environmental innovations may therefore have a crowding out e⁄ect on other potentially more productive
investments or avenues for innovation.
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11 Introduction
"...we have used a variety of market-based policies...to reduce carbon emissions in the most cost-e⁄ective
way, stimulating technological innovation, and harnessing entrepreneurialism."
Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown, 2005.
Policymakers often put forward the argument that environmental regulation can foster innovation.
As the environmental impact of economic activity is largely determined by technology, this possible link
could be crucial to the progression of society towards environmental sustainability. In fact, the seminal
work of Porter (1991) and Porter and van der Linde (1995) argues that environmental regulations can
spur on innovation that may even fully o⁄set the costs of regulatory compliance, thereby improving
competitiveness. Known as the Porter hypothesis, this implies that the regulation would be socially
desirable, even overlooking the environmental concerns it is designed to address. Partly in response to
Porter (1991) and Porter and van der Linde (1995), a large literature has developed that investigates
the impact of environmental regulation on costs, pro￿ts, factor productivity and productive e¢ ciency.
However, the causal mechanism underlying such relationships, and in particular the role of innovation,
remains the subject of only limited empirical scrutiny. As a result, statistical evidence demonstrating a
link between environmental regulation and innovation is sparse.
In this paper, we provide evidence on the determinants of innovation activity using a panel data
set that covers 25 UK manufacturing industries from 2000 to 2006. We consider both environmental
innovation and total innovation expenditures, in the form of either R&D or capital investment. We
capture the burden imposed upon industries by environmental regulation in the form of environmental
protection expenditure. Our sample period is of particular interest because it covers a time in which
the UK had a variety of market-based environmental policies in place, with environmental regulations
focused on outcomes and not processes. Porter (1991) and Porter and van der Linde (1995) argue
that such ￿ exible environmental policy is necessary to encourage innovation.3 Our data are therefore
3The theoretical literature has traditionally favoured the proposition that ￿exible regulations foster innovation to a greater
extent than prescriptive regulations, which are more restrictive. For example, both Milliman and Prince (1989) and Jung
et al. (1996) ￿nd that auctioned emission permits, emission taxes and grandfathered emission permits all provide greater
incentives for innovation than direct controls or performance standards. However, more recently some studies challenge
this consensus. Ulph (1998) and Fischer et al. (2003) ￿nd that an unambiguous ranking of policy instruments according
2ideal for directly testing the relationships underpinning the Porter hypothesis. This is in contrast to
previous studies of environmental compliance costs and innovation, which use environmental protection
expenditure data from the US PACE survey, conducted annually between 1973 and 1994 (Ja⁄e and
Palmer (1997); Brunnermeier and Cohen (2003)). During that period of time, Porter and van der Linde
(1995) explain that US environmental regulations were often crafted in a way that deterred innovative
solutions, or even rendered them impossible.
We also make an important methodological contribution to the literature by using a generalised
method of moments (GMM) estimation procedure. This allows for the possibility that innovation is
dynamic in nature, such that it depends upon its own past realisations. Hence our analysis is consistent
with the paradigm of dynamic competitiveness emphasised by Porter and van der Linde (1995). In
addition, the estimation framework explicitly accounts for the likely endogeneity of environmental costs.
As we are investigating the possibility that environmental compliance costs stimulate innovation designed
to lower such costs, a direct corollary is that we are estimating a simultaneously determined relationship.
This is not explicitly taken into account by Ja⁄e and Palmer (1997) and Brunnermeier and Cohen (2003).
From the analysis we ￿nd that environmental R&D and investment in environmental capital are
stimulated by greater pollution abatement pressures. We therefore ￿nd evidence of a speci￿c component of
the Porter hypothesis; industry does indeed engage in innovation-based solutions to meet the requirements
of environmental regulations. However, we do not ￿nd a positive impact of environmental compliance
costs on total R&D or total capital accumulation. This supports the counter-argument to the Porter
hypothesis that the new environmental innovations have a crowding out e⁄ect on other (potentially more
productive) investments or avenues for innovation.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. The next section provides a brief review of the prior
literature on the relationship between environmental regulation and innovation. Section 3 then describes
the econometric model and our estimation procedure. Section 4 explains our approach to measuring
innovation and environmental regulation. This section also provides descriptive statistics. In section 5
to their innovation-stimulating e⁄ects is not possible. Furthermore, Bauman et al. (2008) criticise previous papers (in
particular Milliman and Prince (1989) and Jung et al. (1996)) that make the assumption that innovation reduces marginal
abatement costs at all margins. Bauman et al. (2008) argue that this connection is non-existent in the case of production
process innovations, in which case marginal abatement costs are likely to increase at some margins (and in important cases,
at all margins). Bauman et al. (2008) then demonstrate that direct controls are not universally inferior to market-based
instruments in providing strong incentives for production process innovations that increase marginal abatement costs.
3we present, explain and discuss our results. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 Prior literature on environmental regulations and innovation
The paradigm of dynamic competitiveness postulates that successful ￿rms are those which have a capacity
to adjust in order to favourably shift constraints. Regulatory pressures to abate pollution that raise costs
might therefore encourage ￿rms to ￿nd innovative ways to reduce their pollution emissions, in an e⁄ort to
establish a long-run competitive advantage. This is classi￿ed as the ￿ weak￿Porter hypothesis by Ja⁄e and
Palmer (1997), following Porter and van der Linde￿ s (1995) discussion of the environment-competitiveness
relationship.4
A small number of empirical studies have now shed light on the ￿ weak￿formulation of the Porter
hypothesis by examining in a systematic way the relationship between the stringency of environmental
regulation and innovative activity or technological di⁄usion. Lanjouw and Mody (1996) provide one
of the ￿rst attempts. They show that across the US, Japan and Germany, in the 1970s and 1980s,
environmental patents respond to abatement expenditure. Innovation in a country is also found to
respond to regulation in other countries. However, Lanjouw and Mody (1996) simply focus on the
correlation between environmental innovation and regulation, and do not control for other variables.
Ja⁄e and Palmer (1997) analyse the relationship between the stringency of environmental regulation
and innovative activity by manufacturing ￿rms using US industry-level data, from the late 1970s to early
1990s. As with Lanjouw and Mody (1996), Ja⁄e and Palmer (1997) use information on environmen-
tal regulatory compliance expenditures to measure stringency. However, they take a broader view of
innovation in the sense that they look at aggregate R&D activity, and the total number of successful
patent applications, rather than environmental innovation in particular. They consider data at the two-
or three-digit SIC level, and estimate parsimonious model speci￿cations. The results are mixed in the
sense that the relationship between regulatory stringency and innovative activity depends on the measure
of innovation. Environmental compliance expenditures are found to have a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect
4Ja⁄e and Palmer (1997) also propose a ￿ narrow￿ Porter hypothesis that certain types of environmental regulation
stimulate innovation. In particular, environmental regulation that focuses on outcomes i.e. the goals of the regulation, and
not the processes by which to achieve these goals, will foster innovation. In addition, Ja⁄e and Palmer (1997) formulate a
￿ strong￿Porter hypothesis that environmental regulation induces ￿rms to ￿nd new products or processes that both comply
with the regulation and improve performance. There is a relatively extensive empirical literature that addresses the ￿ stong￿
Porter hypothesis (e.g. Boyd and McClelland (1999), Smith and Walsh (2000), Gray and Shadbegian (2003), Murty and
Kumar (2003), Piot-Lepetit and Le Moing (2007)).
4on R&D expenditures when industry-speci￿c e⁄ects are controlled for, although the magnitude of the
e⁄ect is small. This result is robust to changes in the model speci￿cation. On the other hand, the e⁄ect
on successful patent applications is insigni￿cant. As Ja⁄e and Palmer (1997) note, however, their data
on patents are only a crude measure of inventive output by that industry, in part due to the problems
associated with classifying patents by industry of origin. Overall, Ja⁄e and Palmer (1997) conclude that
to some extent their results are consistent with the ￿ weak￿version of the Porter hypothesis.
Brunnermeier and Cohen (2003) provide panel data evidence on the determinants of environmental
innovation in 146 three-digit SIC level US manufacturing industries. Over the period 1983 to 1992, it
is found that increases in pollution abatement expenditure were associated with a small but statistically
signi￿cant increase in the number of successful environmental patent applications granted to an indus-
try. A 0.04% increase in patents arises per $1million of abatement expenditure. However, measures of
regulatory monitoring and enforcement were found to be an insigni￿cant determinant of environmental
innovation.
Popp (2006) examines innovation and the di⁄usion of air pollution control equipment. Using patent
data from the US, Japan and Germany, it is found overall that innovation does indeed respond to
environmental regulatory pressure in the home country. The US was an early adopter of stringent SO2
standards, and shortly afterwards this was followed by a very signi￿cant increase in the number of patents.
Similar trends are observed in Japan and Germany following the implementation of stringent nitrogen
oxide (NOx) regulations. However, in contrast to Lanjouw and Mody (1996), inventors are not found to
respond to foreign environmental regulations.
Arimura et al. (2007) use a unique database collected by the OECD in 2003 on environmental
policy, environmental R&D expenditure, environmental performance and commercial performance in
seven OECD countries. They ￿nd a positive and signi￿cant relationship between the probability of a
facility investing in environmental R&D and the stringency of environmental regulations. Horbach (2008)
also estimates discrete choice models of the determinants of environmental innovation using two ￿rm-level
German panel datasets. In support of the arguments made by Porter and van der Linde (1995), Horbach
(2008) ￿nds that environmental regulation, environmental management tools and general organisational
5changes and improvements are all signi￿cant motivations for conducting environmental innovation.
3 Econometric model
We analyse the relationship between the costs of environmental regulations and innovative activity by
manufacturing ￿rms using industry level data over time. We follow the existing literature (Ja⁄e and
Palmer (1997); Brunnermeier and Cohen (2003)) in estimating a reduced-form regression, which takes
the form:
Innovationit = ￿i + ￿t + ￿1Innovationit￿1 + ￿2EnvironmentalCostsit + ￿nXn
it + "it (1)
where i denotes industries and t years. Innovation is a measure of investment in innovation and
EnvironmentalCosts is a measure of the costs of achieving compliance with environmental regulations.
We use a variety of di⁄erent measures of both innovation and environmental costs. The following section
discusses in detail the various alternative proxy variables used. Xn
it is a set of control variables, ￿i is an
individual (industry) e⁄ect and ￿t is a year e⁄ect. Time e⁄ects (￿t) are included in order to control for
time-dependent determinants of innovation that are common to all industries, such as changes in policy
a⁄ecting overall innovation incentives. Finally, "it is a residual error term capturing all other e⁄ects.
The inclusion of industry e⁄ects implies that the identi￿cation of the parameters in equation (1) will
come from across time variation within industries. This captures the response of industries to regula-
tory shocks, rather than unobserved time-independent industry characteristics which generate inherent
di⁄erences in between-industry innovation activity. As model (1) sheds light on the overall industry
response to the burden of environmental regulations, the results are particularly relevant to e⁄orts to
advance towards a clean national economy. Potential problems which may arise in modelling spillovers
of investment in innovation between ￿rms within an industry are avoided. In addition, the fact that we
do not merely focus on a given industry allows us to account for inter-industry spillovers which may arise
due to the close linkages associated with many di⁄erent sectors in the manufacturing process. Further-
more, by considering a range of channels through which industries may attempt to evolve and develop
their products and/or related processes to meet environmental objectives, some of which are novel to the
literature, we aim to overcome the inherently imprecise nature of innovative activity.
6Equation (1) is a dynamic model in which innovation is determined by past realisations of itself. The
argument that ￿rms/industries which exhibit greater investment in technological development are also
more likely to engage in innovative practices in the future is emphasised by Baumol (2002). There are
many reasons why; one idea may simply lead to another, or a new product may invite investment aimed
at its improvement or the creation of superior substitutes. Baumol (2002) also discusses how ￿rms may
develop a greater understanding of the innovation process itself with the more innovation they undertake.
As a result, innovation activity is likely to be persistent. In addition to overall innovation expenditure,
this hypothesis might also be relevant to innovation speci￿cally designed to reduce environmental impacts
(Horbach, 2008).
We also consider extensions to the baseline regression (1). These include introducing quadratic or
interaction terms where they might be motivated by previous empirical work or justi￿ed by economic
theory. In particular, we allow for possible non-linearities in the response of industries to environmental
costs.
3.1 Estimation methodology
We are testing the hypothesis that industries will respond to stringent environmental regulations by
investing in technological improvement. In this way, industries aim to reduce their environmental costs.
However, we take the approach of measuring the regulatory burden in terms of environmental costs. A
corollary is that EnvironmentalCosts is simultaneously determined with Innovation. Failure to take
account of this two-way relationship will in general lead to a simultaneity bias. One solution is to
use exogenous instruments for environmental costs. Unfortunately, possible exogenous instruments for
EnvironmentalCosts are likely to be determined by innovation expenditure, and consequently will also
be correlated with the error term. We must therefore focus on estimation methods that can be used in
the absence of strictly exogenous explanatory variables or instruments.
We use generalised method of moments (GMM) estimators developed for dynamic models of panel
data. These models include lags of the dependent variable as covariates, and contain unobserved individual-
level e⁄ects (￿xed or random). A consistent GMM estimator of dynamic panel models was derived by
7Arellano and Bond (1991). It involves eliminating the individual e⁄ect by ￿rst-di⁄erencing equation (1):
￿Innovationit = ￿t + ￿1￿Innovationit￿1 + ￿2￿EnvironmentalCostsit + ￿n￿Xn
it + ￿"it (2)
This di⁄erence GMM estimator uses previous observations of the endogenous explanatory variable EnvironmentalCosts
and lagged-dependent variable as instruments.5 It makes the assumption that the error term "it is not
serially correlated and that the explanatory variables are uncorrelated with future realisations of the
error term. We then use the following moment conditions in our application of the Arellano-Bond (1991)
estimator:
E[Innovationit￿2("it ￿ "it￿1)] = 0 (3)
E[EnvironmentalCostsit￿2("it ￿ "it￿1)] = 0 (4)
for t = 3;:::;T.6 In our estimations below, we have a reasonably large set of instruments available because
T is 7. However, as there are only few cross-sectional units (20-25 industries), we should restrict the set of
moment conditions to avoid an over￿tting bias (see Roodman, 2009). Hence we use as instruments only
the ￿rst appropriate previous observation of the lagged dependent variable and EnvironmentalCosts
variable. All other explanatory variables are treated as exogenous.
The di⁄erence estimator based on the moment conditions (3) and (4) does however have important
limitations. In particular, it has been shown to have a large ￿nite sample bias and poor precision (Alonso-
Borrego and Arellano, 1999). This has been attributed to the lagged levels providing weak instruments for
the ￿rst-di⁄erences when the explanatory variables are persistent over time. Arellano and Bover (1995)
and Blundell and Bond (1998) show that the bias and imprecision can be overcome by building a system of
two equations. This system combines the di⁄erence equation (2) using lagged levels as instruments, with
the equation in levels (1) for which lagged di⁄erences of the explanatory variables are used as instruments.
The additional moment conditions for the second part of the system (i.e. the regression in levels) include:
E[(Innovationit￿1 ￿ Innovationit￿2)(￿i + "it)] = 0 (5)
E[(EnvironmentalCostsit￿1 ￿ EnvironmentalCostsit￿2)(￿i + "it)] = 0 (6)
5The control variables in the vector Xn
it are exogenous and so are used to instrument themselves.
6We also have an additional, trivial moment condition in which the vector of control variables instruments for itself.
8where recall that ￿i is the individual-e⁄ect. Hence these additional moment conditions are only valid if the
individual-level e⁄ects are uncorrelated with the ￿rst di⁄erence of the ￿rst observation of the dependent
and endogenous variables.
We therefore aim to generate consistent and e¢ cient parameter estimates by employing the system
GMM estimator that uses the moment conditions (3), (4), (5) and (6). We perform a misspeci￿cation
test for second-order serial correlation in the ￿rst-di⁄erenced error term i.e. a test of whether ￿"it is
correlated with ￿"it￿2. Failure to reject the null hypothesis indicates that the original error term "it
(in levels) is not serially correlated at order 1, thereby supporting the estimated model.7 Evidence of
second-order serial correlation in the di⁄erenced residual suggests that "it is serially correlated at order
1 (and perhaps higher orders). In this case we might consider re-specifying the model using higher order
lags as instruments. We also test for the validity of the instruments using a Sargan test of overidentifying
restrictions. This involves testing the null hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are valid by
analysing the sample analogue of the moment conditions used in the estimation process. The alternative
hypothesis is that at least one of the instruments is correlated with the error term "it and therefore not
valid.8
4 Data
In order to assess the robustness of any relationship between the burden of environmental regulations and
innovation, we use a variety of measures for both. In each case, we de￿ ate the data using industry-speci￿c
price de￿ ators to obtain real series. We now discuss these variables in more detail.
4.1 Innovation
Porter and van der Linde (1995) can be interpreted in di⁄erent ways regarding the nature of the innovation
they describe at the centre of the Porter hypothesis. They mention that they use the term ￿ innovation￿
broadly, to include "a product￿ s or service￿ s design, the segments it serves, how it is produced, how
it is marketed and how it is supported" (pp. 98). We consider both innovation that is conducted in-
house or by a third party. We also consider the adoption of successful innovation by others (technology
7We do not test for ￿rst-order serial correlation (i.e. correlation between ￿"it and ￿"it￿1) as it expected even if "it is
serially uncorrelated.
8The Sargan test requires homoscedastic errors for consistency.
9di⁄usion). We focus on input measures of innovation that have uncertain outcomes, rather than output
measures. This is because the hypothesis we are investigating is that environmental regulations provide a
greater incentive to invest in innovation. The innovation may or may not be successful in actually raising
productivity or lowering costs.
Bearing all this in mind, we therefore use four alternative measures of innovation. The ￿rst two aim
to directly measure environmental innovation. They are obtained from the Environmental Protection
Expenditure survey. One is expenditure on environmental R&D (EnvironR&D). This is de￿ned as the
R&D conducted by a ￿rm speci￿cally to reduce the environmental impact of its activities. It includes both
in-house R&D and amounts paid to others, such as trade associations and consultants for R&D. The other
direct measure of environmental innovation considered is integrated environmental protection capital
expenditures (EnvironCapital). This is de￿ned as capital expenditure on new or modi￿ed production
facilities which are designed to integrate environmental protection into the production process. This
might involve adapting an existing process, in which case the expenditure counted is the total cost of
the adaptation. Alternatively, it might include installing an entirely new process, in which case the
expenditure counted is the extra cost compared to the installation of a less environmentally friendly
alternative (DEFRA, 2009, pp. 4). Considering integrated environmental protection capital expenditures
recognises that purchased capital may embody R&D investments made by others. Environmental capital
therefore captures a di⁄erent side to environmental innovation than environmental R&D, and also ￿ts
well with some of the kinds of innovation that Porter hypothesises would take place.
The other two measures of innovation considered take a broader view of innovation, and are taken from
the OECD database. These include, following Ja⁄e and Palmer (1997), total R&D activity (TotalR&D).
In addition, we investigate whether total investment in physical capital (TotalCapital) is determined by
environmental regulations. Capital formation captures the extent to which companies integrate newer
technologies into their operations, in which innovation is embodied. Again, the possibility that ￿rms
￿ buy in￿innovation in this way is overlooked by measures such as R&D. There are existing studies of
the relationship between capital investment and environmental regulations (e.g. Nelson et al. (1993)
and Gray and Shadbegian (1998)). However, these studies do not couch capital formation as a means of
10generating innovation o⁄sets.
We consider broader forms of innovation, rather than only focusing on environmental innovation, for
a number of reasons. In particular, even if innovation is motivated primarily by a desire to address envi-
ronmental impacts, in practice this is often synonymous with creating better performing, higher quality
products and/or production processes in general. Indeed, this point is emphasised by Porter and van der
Linde (1995). It may therefore be that environmental regulation encourages broader forms of innovation
that are not fully captured by, for instance, measuring environmental R&D expenditure. Alternatively,
environmental regulation could stimulate environmental innovation at the expense of other innovative
activities. This would be the case if the supply of inputs to innovation is inelastic. Consequently, the
induced-innovation may create an opportunity cost that negates the e⁄ects observed in the regulated part
of the economy (Ja⁄e et al., 2002). This opportunity cost could be large if there is an impact on successful
innovation elsewhere. We cannot estimate the opportunity cost of any increase in environmental R&D
expenditure, or integrated environmental protection expenditure. However, by measuring the impact of
regulation on total R&D investment/capital formation we at least ensure that the dependent variable is
una⁄ected by an increase in environmental innovation that simply crowds out R&D/capital expenditure
by the industry elsewhere. In other words, greater consideration can be given to the general equilibrium
e⁄ects of induced-innovation.
4.2 Environmental regulations
In the UK, formal environmental regulations are the responsibility of both the Environment Agency and
local authorities. The local authorities regulate small plants whilst larger plants whose polluting out-
put is of national signi￿cance are regulated by the Environment Agency. The traditional approach to
environmental regulation in the UK is direct regulation, which operates through various environmental
￿ permits￿ , including licences, consents, registrations, notices and direct application of the legislation. UK
plants have to apply to either the local authority or the Environment Agency for a permit if they are
to operate certain industrial processes. The regulator can either reject the application, or accept with
certain conditions attached. The permits typically limit the level of air, water or land pollution that can
be generated by a particular site. For instance, in the case of air pollutants, safe concentration levels
11should not be exceeded. This implies that regulations are often more stringent in urban areas, where
background concentration levels will already be quite high. The permits are reviewed periodically to make
sure they keep pace with changing circumstances. In addition to direct regulation, increasing emphasis
is now placed on alternative methods of regulation. These include environmental taxes, such as the 2001
land￿ll tax or 2001 climate change levy and associated climate change agreements. Enhanced capital
allowances have been recently introduced to encourage the take-up of innovative energy-e¢ cient tech-
nologies. Also more common are negotiated/voluntary agreements, which achieve higher than required
environmental outcomes, usually to avoid the threat of legislation or regulation. Examples include the
motor industry￿ s emission reduction targets agreed with the European Union, and the chemical industry￿ s
voluntary commitment to achieve a certain environmental target. There is also a voluntary agreement
on the use of pesticides. Finally, trading schemes are growing in popularity as a means of achieving envi-
ronmental objectives is trading schemes, with examples including the (voluntary) UK Emissions Trading
Scheme, which ran from 2002-2006, prior to the EU Emission Trading Scheme, and the 2008 UK National
Emissions Reduction Plan.9
Ideally, we would like to look at the relationship between innovation and the shadow price of pollution
or environmental inputs (Ja⁄e et al. 2002). However, we do not easily observe such shadow prices. We
therefore use pollution abatement expenditure data as a proxy for the shadow price of pollution, or more
loosely, the burden (costs) of environmental regulation upon ￿rms. The source of these data for the UK is
the Environmental Protection Expenditure survey, which provides the best available pollution abatement
cost data outside the US, in terms of industry and year coverage (Cole and Elliott, 2007).
Environmental protection expenditure is de￿ned by the Statistical O¢ ce of the European Community
as the sum of capital and current expenditure on environmental protection activities. An environmental
protection activity is one whose primary objective is "to collect, treat, reduce, prevent or eliminate
pollutants and pollution or any other degradation of the environment resulting from the activity of the
company" (DEFRA, 2009, pp. 3). Environmental protection activities may involve "the use of equipment,
labour, manufacturing techniques and practices, information networks or products" (DEFRA, 2009, pp.
9It is also worth noting that the UK environment agency makes use of educational programmes which help facilitate the
identi￿cation of potential cost-saving improvements.
123). Environmental protection expenditure is reported gross of any cost o⁄sets, which is important to this
analysis, given that it is being used as a proxy for the stringency of environmental regulations. Such cost
o⁄sets may for instance take the form of marketable by-products, savings or subsidies/capital allowances
generated by environmental protection expenditure (DEFRA, 2009, pp. 3).
Environmental protection expenditure has two components. The ￿rst component is environmental
operating expenditure (Operating). This is de￿ned as the in-house operating costs of a company￿ s own
environmental protection activities. It includes labour costs, leasing payments and maintenance costs for
equipment. It also includes payments to others for environmental protection services including treatment
and disposal of waste (DEFRA, 2009, pp. 4). The second component is ￿ end of pipe￿pollution control
expenditure (EndOfPipe). This expenditure is de￿ned as expenditure on equipment used to treat,
handle, measure or dispose of emissions and wastes from production (DEFRA, 2009, pp. 4). In other
words, it is expenditure on equipment designed to clean up at the end of the production process. For
example, this might include e› uent treatment plants, exhaust air scrubbing systems and solid waste
compactors.
Excluded from either environmental operating or ￿ end of pipe￿expenditure is expenditure on environ-
mental R&D. Also excluded are energy costs (except where it is speci￿cally used to run the environmental
protection equipment/services), and expenditure on health and safety equipment/services.
Measuring regulatory costs in terms of pollution abatement expenditure is the standard approach
of a wide range of empirical environmental economics literature, which includes studies of the impact
of environmental regulations on trade, foreign direct investment or competitiveness (e.g. Levinson and
Taylor (2008), Keller and Levinson (2002), Cole and Elliott (2005), Morgenstern et al. (2002)). Most
of these studies focus on the US. In common with this literature, we assume that the direct costs of
environmental regulations are a major component of total environmental protection expenditure.10;11
10Pollution abatement expenditure, as noted by Ja⁄e and Palmer (1997), is not a truly exogenous measure of regulatory
burden since the level of abatement expenditure also depends on the nature of an industry￿ s response to the regulation.
In addition, informal regulation from interest groups or customers, or perhaps simply a social awareness of the ￿rm for
environmental issues, may lead to overcompliance with the formal regulation in place. We do not distinguish between
regulatory and overcompliance pressures in this analysis. In principle this could lead to a selection bias: voluntary abatement
expenditure may be more likely to occur within ￿rms that currently have low pollution abatement costs, and these ￿rms may
also typically have the lowest incentive to innovate in response to the environmental regulation. In this paper, however, we
believe we overcome this potential problem to a large extent by exploiting the panel data to control for ￿xed industry e⁄ects.
Hence our estimates will only be biased if industry heterogeneity in voluntary abatement expenditure is time-varying.
11There may be concern that pollution abatement expenditure data is measured with error. Expenditure may be system-
atically over-reported if ￿rms overstate compliance costs with the aim of deterring a further tightening of existing standards.
134.3 Control variables
We include a variety of control variables which have been shown elsewhere to be important determinants
of innovation. Firstly, we include industry value added (V alueAdded) as this is expected to be correlated
with both innovation and pollution abatement expenditure. Larger industries are likely to have greater
absolute levels of abatement expenditure, and are also more likely to have the resources necessary to meet
the ￿xed costs, and bear the risks, involved with undertaking investments in innovation.
Secondly, we include (domestic) market power as a determinant of innovation (Concentration). We
measure this as the number of enterprises in the industry with 250 or more employees, as a percentage
of the total number of enterprises. Recently, Aghion et al. (2005) ￿nd strong evidence of an inverted-U
relationship between product market competition and innovation. To examine whether this is appropriate
in our dataset we also experiment with a concentration-squared term. Thirdly, we include the intensity
of human capital (HumanCapital), measured as the share of value added paid to skilled workers. Firms
with a greater intensity of human capital may have greater opportunities for technological advancement
and therefore be more innovative.
Fourthly, industry exposure to foreign competition could a⁄ect innovation. One argument is that
strong competition from abroad will give ￿rms a greater incentive to reduce costs, thereby encouraging
innovation, especially if they are competing with ￿rms in countries with less stringent environmental
regulations and lower wages. For example, Scott (1997) uses survey data from 1993 to ￿nd that foreign
competition in the US manufacturing sector increases R&D investments that aim to reduce emissions of
hazardous air pollutants. On the other hand we have the Schumpeterian argument (Schumpeter, 1942).
Hence we include the openness of the sector to trade (Openness), measured as total exports and imports
as a share of value added.
On the other hand, abatement expenditure could systematically under-represent true regulatory costs if, for instance, it
does not capture costs such as managerial time spent dealing with environmental regulators. Empirical evidence is not
conclusive on this issue (contrast for example Gray and Shadbegian (2003) with Morgenstern et al. (2001)). In any case,
we do not believe that this will impact the conclusions of our analysis, as systematic over- or under- reporting of abatement
costs should be captured by industry ￿xed e⁄ects.
144.4 Descriptive statistics
As discussed above, we use data from the Environmental Protection Expenditure survey to measure en-
vironmental costs in the form of operating and ￿ end of pipe￿pollution abatement expenditure (Operating
and EndOfPipe respectively). We also use the survey to measure environmental innovation in the form
of environmental R&D (EnvironR&D) and integrated environmental protection (EnvironCapital). The
survey is carried out annually by DEFRA and is publically available. It covers the period 2000-2006.12
As a ￿rst step to describing our data, we graph our measures of environmental costs and environmental
innovation expenditure in Figure 1, and total innovation expenditure in Figure 2, at the aggregate level.
Figure 1 shows that expenditure on operating costs by UK manufacturing industry ￿ uctuated between £2-
3billion over the sample period. In comparison, aggregate ￿ end of pipe￿pollution abatement expenditure
is far smaller, declining from £630million in 2000 to £270million in 2002, and then remaining around
£300-400million for the rest of the sample period. EnvironR&D seems to follow EndOfPipe closely,
exhibiting an initial decline in investment from 2000 to 2002 before remaining approximately constant
at around £80 million, with a slight peak in 2004 of £110million. Investment in environmental capital
is less closely linked to either Operating or EndOfPipe; EnvironCapital declines from £800million
in 2000 to below £200million in 2003 and 2004, and then increases to £780million by 2006. Turning
to Figure 2, we see the pattern of total R&D expenditures over time is similar to environmental R&D
expenditures, remaining approximately constant between £0.9-1billion with a slight peak in 2004. Total
capital expenditures are far higher, but decline from £25billion in 2000 to around £18billion from 2004
onwards.
We now consider our variables as measured at the industry level. Table 1 gives summary statistics.
The variables are observed for up to 25 two-digit UK SIC (2003) industries covering the manufacturing
sector, and also electricity & gas and the water supply (SIC 40 and 41). All variables are measured in
real £￿ s apart from Concentration, HumanCapital and Openness, which are scaled as described above.
The appendix provides more detailed information on de￿nitions, data sources and units of measurement.
Table 1 shows that with the exception of EndOfPipe, the within variation is smaller than the between
12The Environmental Protection Expenditure survey was also carried out in 2007, although with coverage limited to
large companies in high environmental protection expenditure industries. As this could introduce a variety of estimation
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Figure 2: Aggregate pollution abatement expenditures and total innovation
16variation for all variables. Sometimes this di⁄erence is substantial - for example the between variation
for TotalR&D is more than ten times greater than the within variation. Fixed e⁄ects estimation may
therefore lead to considerable e¢ ciency loss, and in turn be less likely to produce statistically signi￿cant
results, given that it relies on within-group variation to identify the parameters. We may also expect
strongly signi￿cant individual e⁄ects.13
Table 2 reports environmental operating expenditure (Operating) and ￿ end of pipe￿pollution control
expenditure (EndOfPipe) as a percentage of value added, averaged over the sample period (2000-2006)
for each industry.14 For the industries with data available for 2007, we average over 2000-2007. Scaling
by value added is necessary to account for the size of the industry.
It is clear that there is substantial heterogeneity in pollution abatement expenditures across indus-
tries. In terms of environmental operating expenditure, leather products faces the greatest burden, with
4.18% of value added spent on environmental operating expenditure. Coke, petroleum & nuclear fuel
(3.40%), chemicals excluding pharmaceuticals (3.35%), and basic metals (3.32%) also have high operat-
ing expenditure. New technology industries such as medical & optical products and o¢ ce machinery &
equipment tend to have the lowest operating expenditure, at less than 0.5% of value added. For each in-
dustry, environmental ￿ end of pipe￿capital expenditure typically represents a smaller proportion of value
added than operating expenditure, with relatively little between-industry variation. Coke, petroleum
& nuclear fuel has the highest environmental capital expenditure at 1.85% of value added, followed by
chemicals excluding pharmaceuticals at 0.7%. Clothing, o¢ ce machinery & equipment, and medical &
optical products have the lowest environmental capital expenditure. To give these ￿gures some context,
they are similar to those observed for other Western economies. For example, the 2005 US PACE survey
suggests that pollution abatement operating expenditure across manufacturing industries in the US is
very highly correlated with the 2005 data for the UK.15
Table 2 also reports average innovation expenditure for our four measures of innovation (EnvironR&D,
13Table 1 also reveals that TotalCapital has a negative minimum value. This implies that additions to ￿xed assets were
outweighed by disposals of ￿xed assets (i.e. assets being sold o⁄ or scrapped). Negative TotalCapital was only observed
once (for electrical apparatus in 2002).
14Note that some two-digit industries are included as rollup categories. In addition, Chemicals (SIC 24) is disaggregated
into Pharmaceuticals (SIC 244) and other Chemicals industries (SIC 24X).
15This is demonstrated by Table 7 in the appendix. We cannot compare the UK and US data in any other year because

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































19EnvironCapital, TotalR&D and TotalCapital), each as a percentage of industry value added. EnvironR&D
and EnvironCapital are only a small percentage of value added. For example, the industry most in-
tensive in environmental R&D investment is chemicals excluding pharmaceuticals, although even this
industry invests just 0.26% of its value added in environmental R&D. The vast majority of industries
spend less than one-tenth of a percent of their value added on environmental R&D on average over the
sample period. Spending is generally slightly higher for EnvironCapital, but is still only greater than
1% of value added for one industry (electricity, gas, steam & hot water).
The two broader forms of innovation, TotalR&D and TotalCapital, are as expected of much greater
economic signi￿cance. In the case of pharmaceuticals, TotalR&D is extremely high at 46% of value
added on average over the sample period. (Incidentally, this average actually disguises a marked decline
in pharmaceuticals￿R&D expenditure over 2000 to 2006, from 51% to 42% of value added.) In addition,
TotalR&D is almost one quarter of value added for radio, TV & communications, and other transport
equipment. It should be noted that slightly less aggregated data are available for TotalR&D and hence
some previously two-digit industries are now included as rollup categories (i.e. SIC 17-19, 20-22 and
40-41). Thus the total number of industry categories falls to 20 for TotalR&D.16 Meanwhile, Table
2 shows that water supply; electricity, gas, steam & hot water; motor vehicles; and coke, petroleum &
nuclear fuel all invest more than 20% of their value added in capital.17
Table 3 reports the correlations between the average values of the environmental costs and innovation
variables, as observed over the sample period 2000-2006. We note that environmental R&D expenditure
is strongly positively correlated with environmental operating expenditure across industries (0.706), and
is also quite strongly positively correlated with ￿ end of pipe￿capital expenditure (0.489). EnvironCapital
also has a positive and signi￿cant correlation with both measures of environmental protection expenditure
across industries, although the correlation is weaker than for EnvironR&D. In contrast, industries
with higher total R&D expenditure actually tend to have lower environmental operating and ￿ end of
pipe￿expenditure (although in the case of that latter the correlation is insigni￿cant). The correlations
16If we compare these ￿gures to average total R&D expenditure by industry in the US, we ￿nd expenditure is generally
higher in the US than for the corresponding UK industry. Exceptions are coke, petroleum & nuclear fuel (3% of value
added) and pharmaceuticals (30% of value added) which display substantially lower average R&D expenditure in the US.
17Average capital formation in US industries is, with some exceptions, quite similar to that in the UK.
20Table 3: Correlations between variables averaged over 2000-2006
Innovation Operating EndOfPipe EnvironR&D EnvironCapital TotalR&D TotalCapital
Operating N/A
EndOfPipe 0.565*** N/A
EnvironR&D 0.706*** 0.489*** N/A
EnvironCapital 0.386*** 0.200*** 0.161** N/A
TotalR&D -0.247*** -0.028 -0.182** -0.170* N/A
TotalCapital 0.163** 0.224*** -0.000 0.757*** 0.077 N/A
Correlations are calculated between the average values of the variables as observed over the sample period 2000-2006, with
each variable scaled by value added. Operating is environmental operating expenditure and EndOfPipe is end of pipe
environmental capital expenditure. *** indicates signi￿cance at the 1% level, ** signi￿cance at the 5% level and *
signi￿cance at the 10% level.
between the alternative measures of innovation tend to be quite low. In fact, the correlation is negative
between EnvironR&D and TotalR&D, and almost zero between EnvironR&D and TotalCapital, and
TotalR&D and TotalCapital. Hence it appears as though these measures do indeed capture very di⁄erent
aspects of the innovation process. We may therefore expect to obtain di⁄erent results in each case.
5 Empirical results
5.1 Baseline regression results
Table 4 reports the system GMM estimation results for the two measures of environmental innovation
(environmental R&D and integrated environmental protection).18 As mentioned, we use only one lag of
the endogenous explanatory variables as instruments. The model is overidenti￿ed and so it is possible to
use the optimal/two-step GMM estimator, which allows for more e¢ cient estimation than the one-step.
However, in ￿nite samples the two-step estimator generates standard errors that are biased downwards,
and so we correct for this using the standard errors proposed by Windmeijer (2005). These standard
18We focus on levels speci￿cations as they tend to ￿t the data better than logarithmic speci￿cations. We determine
the speci￿cation with the higher goodness-of-￿t by comparing a transformed R-squared from the logarithmic regressions
with the standard R-squared from the levels regressions. If y is the dependent variable then the transformed R-squared is
calculated as the squared correlation between yi and b yi = exp( d logyi) (see Wooldridge, 2009).
21errors permit heteroscedasticity in the underlying error "it.19
Four di⁄erent speci￿cations are estimated for environmental R&D. Speci￿cation (a) measures envi-
ronmental costs in terms of pollution abatement operating expenditure (Operating), while speci￿cation
(b) uses ￿ end of pipe￿expenditure (EndOfPipe). Both (a) and (b) include only industry value added
(V alueAdded) as a single control variable. Speci￿cations (c) and (d) then repeat these two regressions,
but with three additional control variables included (Concentration, HumanCapital and Openness). We
also estimate the same four speci￿cations for integrated environmental protection (speci￿cations (e)-(h)).
The models seem to perform very strongly, with very large Wald statistics convincingly indicating
that the models have overall statistical signi￿cance. The speci￿cation tests also show no signs of invalid
overidenti￿ying restrictions, or second-order serial correlation at the 5% level. Moreover, both operating
and ￿ end of pipe￿protection expenditure are consistently found to have a positive and strongly signi￿cant
e⁄ect on environmental R&D. In terms of the magnitude of the e⁄ect, environmental R&D is around
twice as responsive to ￿ end of pipe￿than operating expenditure. In particular, the models predict that
a £100 increase in Operating would raise EnvironR&D by between £5-6, while a £100 increase in
EndOfPipe would raise EnvironR&D by between £10-12.20 There is also evidence to suggest that
modi￿cations to the production process, which speci￿cally aim to reduce environmental impacts, could
be stimulated by more stringent environmental regulation. In particular, EndOfPipe has a positive and
strongly signi￿cant impact on EnvironCapital, shown by regressions (f) and (h). The magnitude of the
e⁄ect is relatively substantial, with a £100 increase in EndOfPipe predicted to raise EnvironCapital
by £31-£34.21 However, this result is not robust to measuring regulatory compliance costs in terms of
operating expenditure; Operating is found to be an insigni￿cant determinant of integrated environmental
protection in speci￿cations (e) and (g). Hence this evidence suggests that expenditure on environmental
capital aims to reduce the cost of cleaning up emissions and discharges, but does not aim to reduce
expenditure on operating pollution abatement equipment and services.
19Note however that the Windmeijer (2005) standard errors do not permit any serial correlation in "it because then the
estimator is inconsistent.
20We can alternatively express these marginal e⁄ects as beta coe¢ cients. If Operating increases by 1 within-group
standard deviation, then EnvironR&D would increase by between 0.7-0.8 within-group standard deviation units. Similarly,
if EndOfPipe increases by 1 within-group standard deviation, then EnvironR&D would increase by 0.4-0.5 within-group
standard deviation units.
21The corresponding beta coe¢ cients tell us that if EndOfPipe increases by 1 within-group standard deviation, then
EnvironCapital would increase by 0.3-0.4 within-group standard deviation units.
22Table 4 also provides evidence to suggest that environmental innovation is persistent. Spending £100
more on environmental R&D in the last period is estimated to raise current expenditure by between £15-
20, while spending £100 more on integrated environmental protection in the last period raises current
expenditure by between £8-23. Turning to the control variables, (g) and (h) show highly concentrated
industries are statistically less likely to invest in integrated environmental protection.22 This indicates
that competitive pressures may enhance the capabilities and/or incentives that ￿rms have to recon￿gure
processes in order to avoid costly ￿ end of pipe￿treatment to emissions and discharges. This possibility was
anticipated by Porter and van der Linde (1995). Finally, there is surprisingly some evidence to suggest
that HumanCapital reduces environmental innovation (speci￿cations (c) and (h)), although this result
is not statistically signi￿cant across all regressions.
We now consider the system GMM results for the impact of environmental costs on total innovation
expenditure, measured in terms of total R&D expenditure or total capital formation. In both cases,
we consider the same four speci￿cations estimated previously. Table 5 reports these regression results.
Again, the Wald statistics indicate that the explanatory variables are jointly very statistically signi￿cant,
and there is no evidence of model misspeci￿cation. In contrast to the results in Table 4, Operating is
estimated to have a negative impact on total R&D regressions in regressions (a) and (c). The coe¢ cient
on EndOfPipe is also estimated to be negative in regressions (b) and (d), although it is only signi￿cant
at the 10% level at most. The increase in environmental R&D expenditure due to higher environmental
costs therefore seems to be o⁄set by decreased R&D expenditure elsewhere (and the o⁄setting reduction
could possibly even be large enough for total R&D to fall). This result contrasts with Ja⁄e and Palmer￿ s
(1997) ￿nding in the US that total R&D is stimulated by environmental costs, but supports the ￿ndings
of Lanoie et al. (2007), who use a 2003 database for seven OECD countries.
Turning to the impact of environmental costs on total capital formation, the results are now somewhat
mixed. Model (e) suggests that Operating has a strongly signi￿cant and positive impact on capital
formation, but this becomes a negative impact which is insigni￿cant when additional controls are added
in model (g). Meanwhile, EndOfPipe has a negative impact on capital formation, although regression
(h) shows that this is only weakly signi￿cant with additional controls. We therefore have a similar story
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































25to that observed for total R&D: the increased investment in environmental capital due to higher ￿ end of
pipe￿expenditure does not remain when considering total capital expenditure. It therefore appears that
there are o⁄setting e⁄ects due to decreased expenditure on other forms of capital, and moreover total
capital expenditure may in fact fall.
A possible negative relationship between abatement requirements and total capital investment could
arise if more stringent environmental regulations are applied to new sources pollution. Nelson et al.
(1993) argue this is the case in the US, and ￿nd evidence that it increases the attractiveness of old
capital relative to new capital, thus reducing the rate of capital turnover. The UK may be similar to
the US. Indeed, the environmental regulation in the UK is such that all new ￿rms have to reach a new
plant standard, while existing plants have some time over which to reach this standard. In addition,
if emissions are already particularly high in a region, economic activity from new capital investments
may have to meet particularly stringent regulatory requirements in order for this to be approved. The
di⁄erential nature of environmental regulations in this respect could be the reason why the positive e⁄ect
of environmental compliance costs on environmental capital is o⁄set.
Of the remaining control variables within Table 4, the results suggest a high degree of persistence,
in particular in the case of total R&D. This perhaps explains the insigni￿cance of the remaining con-
trol variables in this regression. For total capital formation the regressions show that higher industry
concentration may lead to higher rates of capital accumulation, while higher human capital leads to a
lower rate of physical capital accumulation. The latter ￿nding may arise because a weaker capability
for an industry to conduct its own innovation research may increase the industry￿ s tendency to ￿ buy in￿
innovative investments made by others in the form of capital formation.
5.2 Extensions to baseline regressions
All the models considered thus far assume that the slope coe¢ cients ￿ in equation (1) are constant across
industries. This assumption may be inappropriate. In particular, industries may be heterogeneous in their
response to changes in environmental costs. We might expect that the higher the environmental costs of
the industry, the greater the extent to which further increases in compliance costs generate opportunities
for pro￿table investment in innovation. Porter and van der Linde (1995) could be interpreted as discussing
26this possibility: they mention how lax regulation can be dealt with using secondary treatment solutions
and without innovation, but as the cost of compliance rises with the stringency of regulations, "the
potential for innovation o⁄sets may rise even faster" (pp. 100).
We examine whether or not there are non-linearities in environmental costs by introducing interac-
tion terms between dummy variables for medium and high environmental cost sectors (MediumCosts
and HighCosts respectively), and Operating or EndOfPipe.23 Low environmental cost industries are
therefore the reference category. We consider high environmental cost sectors as the ￿ve sectors with
the highest total environmental protection expenditure (i.e. operating plus ￿ end of pipe￿expenditure)
as a percentage of value added, on average over the sample period. From Table 2, these include leather
products; pulp & paper; coke, petroleum & nuclear fuel; chemicals excluding pharmaceuticals; and basic
metals. Each of these sectors spent more than 3% of their value added on pollution abatement. We
consider low environmental cost sectors as the ￿ve sectors with the lowest pollution abatement expendi-
ture. These industries are clothing; publishing and printing; o¢ ce machinery & equipment; medial and
optical products; and other transport equipment. Each of these sectors spent less than 0.7% of their
value added on environmental protection expenditure. The remaining industries are classi￿ed as having
medium environmental costs.
Table 6 reports the estimation results with the interaction terms. We do not include the additional
control variables as they are almost always insigni￿cant.24 From regressions (a) and (b), we ￿nd there
is evidence to suggest that the impact of environmental compliance costs on environmental R&D di⁄ers
between high, medium and low cost industries. In low compliance cost industries, both Operating and
EndOfPipe have a negative and statistically signi￿cant impact on EnvironR&D. Hence ￿rms in low
cost industries actually seem to direct resources away from environmental innovation as compliance costs
rise. This could be because these ￿rms focus instead on direct abatement measures, as Porter and van
der Linde (1995) suggest. Meanwhile, the coe¢ cient on the interaction term with medium cost industries
is positive, for both Operating and EndOfPipe. However, it is not quite of a su¢ cient magnitude for
23As with Operating and EndOfPipe, the interaction terms are treated as endogenous, instrumented with only the ￿rst
appropriate lag.
24In addition, including additional control variables tends to generate estimation di¢ culties due to a nonsymmetric or










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































28there to overall be a positive relationship between environmental R&D and compliance costs in medium
cost industries. In contrast, and as expected, environmental R&D does have a positive relationship with
environmental compliance costs in high cost industries. The positive coe¢ cient on the interaction term
is also found to be statistically di⁄erent to the negative coe¢ cient for low cost industries (i.e. both
Operating ￿ HighCosts and EndOfPipe ￿ HighCosts are signi￿cant). The strength of the positive
relationship for high cost industries must therefore drive the overall positive relationship observed in
Table 4. It is also interesting to note that the models of environmental R&D with interaction terms
appear to ￿t the data better than any of the previous baseline regressions.
However, the results observed for environmental R&D are not observed for any other measure of
innovation. The interaction terms for integrated environmental protection and total capital expenditure
are found to be insigni￿cant. In the case of total R&D, the pattern of coe¢ cient signs is the opposite
to that for environmental R&D. In particular, model (f) shows the coe¢ cient on EndOfPipe is strongly
positive and signi￿cant for low cost industries. Meanwhile, EndOfPipe is statistically insigni￿cant for
medium and high cost industries (the interaction terms are strongly negative and signi￿cant relative to
the low cost industry base category). Regression (e) shows a similar pattern in terms of the signs of
the coe¢ cients for Operating, although the di⁄erence between industries is no longer signi￿cant. The
￿nding that increased environmental R&D is o⁄set by reductions in R&D elsewhere following a rise in
compliance costs, as discussed previously, therefore appears to be largely taking place in the medium and
high environmental cost industries.
6 Conclusion
This paper has provided an empirical investigation of the hypothesis that environmental regulations stim-
ulate investment in innovation. We ￿nd that dynamic panel estimators - which allow current innovation
expenditure to depend on its previous values, and explicitly address possible endogeneity - are able to
identify statistically signi￿cant relationships. In particular, they provide generally robust evidence that
environmental compliance costs stimulate environmental R&D, and also encourage industries to adapt
their production facilities in order to integrate environmental protection into the production process.
However, we do not ￿nd a positive impact of environmental compliance costs on total R&D or total
29capital investment. Hence any increased environmental innovation is possibly being o⁄set by lower in-
novation expenditure elsewhere. We also identify that the relationship between environmental R&D and
environmental compliance costs is heterogeneous across industries; in fact it is only positive for high
environmental cost (￿ dirty￿ ) industries.
The analysis suggests that although environmental regulations may stimulate environmental innova-
tion, this is only achieved by diverting resources away from alternative investments in innovation. Hence
the assertion by Porter (1991) and Porter and van der Linde (1995) that ￿rms themselves bene￿t from
properly crafted environmental regulation can only be justi￿ed if the new environmental innovations are
more productive than the innovations the ￿rm would have made otherwise. Porter and van der Linde
(1995) argue this may be the case, given that their case study evidence demonstrates that environmental
innovations can exhibit high returns. The obvious next step to the analysis would be to explore this issue
further, and attempt to determine whether the increased environmental innovation comes at the expense
of industry pro￿tability.
In this analysis we have used the Environmental Protection Expenditure survey dataset, which is
the best available dataset outside the US in terms of industry and year coverage. Nonetheless, it has
limitations that should be taken into account. For instance, DEFRA cautions that the survey data are
subject to large con￿dence intervals due to relatively low response rates. Furthermore, in this analysis, the
manufacturing sector is divided into just 25 industry categories, which is a very high level of aggregation.
We also only have 7 years of data. Unfortunately the Environmental Protection Expenditure survey has
from 2007 onwards reduced somewhat in size and scope and so economists will have to turn to other
datasets to solve these issues. In particular, it would be interesting to conduct a similar study for the
UK using a ￿rm level dataset.
30Appendix
Dependent variables
EnvironR&D: Real expenditure on R&D to reduce the environmental impacts of economic activity.
This includes in-house R&D and amounts paid to others, such as trade associations and consultants for
R&D. Source: Environmental Protection Expenditure survey.
EnvironCapital: Real capital expenditure on integrated processes designed to integrate environmental
protection into the production process. This might include adaptation of an existing installation/process
whereby the integrated expenditure is then the total purchase cost of the adaptation. It also includes
installing a new process in which the design takes environmental protection into account. In this case
the expenditure counted is only the extra cost compared with installing a less environmental friendly
alternative. Examples include installations for the reuse of water and waste gas. Source: Environmental
Protection Expenditure survey.
TotalR&D: Real total R&D expenditure. Source: OECD.
TotalCapital: Real gross ￿xed capital formation. These capital expenditures exclude the EndOfPipe
capital expenditures. Source: OECD.
Explanatory variables
Operating: Real pollution abatement operating expenditure. Includes in-house expenditure associated
with the operation of pollution control abatement equipment and services, and also payments to external
organisations for environmental protection services (including waste disposal and sewage treatment).
Source: Environmental Protection Expenditure survey.
EndOfPipe: Real expenditure on ￿ end of pipe￿pollution control equipment. This is equipment used to
treat, handle, measure or dispose of emissions and wastes from production. Examples include e› uent
treatment plants, exhaust air scrubbing systems and solid waste compactors. Source: Environmental
Protection Expenditure survey.
V alueAdded: Real value added. Source: OECD.
Concentration: The total number of enterprises in the industry with 250 or more employees, divided by
the total number of enterprises in the industry. Source: OECD.
31HumanCapital: The share of value added paid to skilled workers: (Employee Compensation/valueadded)-
((Minimum wage*NumberEmployees)/valueadded). Source: OECD.
Openness: Total exports and imports as a share of value added: (Exports + Imports)/valueadded.
Source: OECD.
Table 7: UK and US pollution abatement operating costs (PAOCs) as % of value added by industry, 2005
Industry SIC code UK PAOCs NAICS code US PAOCs
Food products, beverages & tobacco 15 & 16 1.5701 311 & 312 1.1623
Textiles 17 1.8160 314 0.9245
Clothing 18 1.0665 315 N/A
Leather products 19 3.7736 316 2.8905
Timber & wood products 20 1.5793 321 1.4741
Pulp & paper 21 3.3926 322 3.5749
Publishing & printing 22 0.3628 323 0.1259
Coke, petroleum & nuclear fuel 23 3.0684 324 5.2834
Pharmaceuticals 244 1.0835 3254 0.5635
Chemicals excluding pharmaceuticals 24X 3.2015 325X 3.8271
Rubber & plastics 25 1.8881 326 0.7504
Non-metallic mineral products 26 1.2613 327 1.3128
Basic metals 27 1.8956 331 4.0657
Fabricated metal products 28 0.8640 332 0.6169
Machinery 29 0.7305 333 0.2829
O¢ ce machinery &equipment 30 0.6569
Electrical apparatus 31 0.5518
334 & 335 0.4525
Radio, TV & communications 32 0.5152
Medical & optical products 33 0.1657
Motor vehicles 34 0.9073
336 0.7378
Other transport equipment 35 0.7318
Furniture 36 1.0760 337 0.1338
Correlation coe¢ cient between UK and US PAOCs 0.825
Spearman￿ s rank correlation coe¢ cient between UK and US PAOCs 0.870
Note: US PAOCs for clothing (NAICS 315) is omitted due to missing data. NAICS 334 and 335 cover SIC 30, 31, 32 and 33, and
NAICS 336 covers SIC 34 and 35. In calculating the correlation coe¢ cient we use total PAOCs as a percentage of total value
added for these combined SIC categories.
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